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“You Can’t Legislate the Heart”:
Minneapolis Mayor Charles Stenvig
and the Politics of Law and Order
Jeffrey T. Manuel and Andrew Urban
 In 1969, four-term Democratic-Farmer Labor (DFL) mayor and former 
University of Minnesota political science professor Arthur Naftalin declined to 
run for a fifth two-year term as the mayor of Minneapolis, leaving the contest 
open amid the social turbulence of the late 1960s. Naftalin was a close associate 
of former Minneapolis mayor Hubert H. Humphrey and a practitioner of 
Humphrey’s brand of liberalism. They believed that government’s role was to 
manage and coordinate different interest groups within society, such as business 
leaders, members of organized labor, and racial minorities, so that the city would 
function efficiently and social conflict could be avoided. By allocating money 
to various social programs, they believed urban problems such as crime and 
poverty could be solved.1 In an unexpected move, Charles Stenvig, a 41-year-
old detective in the Minneapolis police department and president of the police 
federation, threw his hat into the ring as an independent candidate for mayor. 
Running an unconventional campaign that spent little money and relied on 
volunteer labor, Stenvig won the 1969 election by pledging to “take the handcuffs 
off the police” and to crack down on “racial militants,” criminals, and student 
protesters.2 Capturing 62 percent of the vote against a moderate Republican 
opponent, Stenvig shocked the city’s political establishment with his convincing 
victory. Running again as an independent in 1971, Stenvig defeated Harry Davis, 
Minneapolis’s first black mayoral candidate, receiving a remarkable 71 percent 
of the vote. After losing to DFL candidate Albert Hofstede in 1973, Stenvig 
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reclaimed the mayoralty for a final two-year term in 1975, only to lose a rubber 
match to Hofstede in 1977. By the end of the 1970s, Stenvig’s political career 
was effectively over.
 Stenvig was not alone as a law and order mayor in 1960s and 1970s urban 
America. As historian Michael Flamm argues, the crime issue moved from the 
national to the local level after the 1968 presidential election.3 In the wake of 
urban riots in Watts, Detroit, and Newark, conservative white politicians across 
the nation successfully attacked liberals for their permissive attitudes toward 
social protest. Conservatives also blamed liberal politicians for the increase in 
individual criminal acts that occurred in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, 
which conservatives argued reflected the fallacy behind liberals’ approach to 
crime. In Los Angeles, Mayor Sam Yorty used the Watts’ riot as a platform for 
a law and order campaign in the 1969 mayoral election. Philadelphia’s Frank 
Rizzo followed Stenvig’s move from the police force to city hall in 1971, despite 
allegations that as police commissioner Rizzo employed brutality and public 
humiliation as tactics against Philadelphia’s black residents. The widespread 
success of law and order candidates in American cities in the late 1960s and 
throughout the 1970s highlights the continuing politicization of crime at the 
local level well after the national turmoil of the late 1960s had died down.
 In addition to highlighting the rise of law and order mayors in the 1960s 
and 1970s, this article focuses on how Stenvig successfully opposed liberalism’s 
reliance on social scientific explanations to address issues such as crime. 
Stenvig’s idiosyncratic brand of populism proved immensely popular with voters 
when compared to the technocratic expertise of the liberal politicians whom he 
Figure 1: Minneapolis Mayor Charles Stenvig at a victory party. Image courtesy 
of Minnesota Historical Society.
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challenged.4 Stenvig argued that technocratic solutions, and the sociological 
explanations they rested on, were an ineffective remedy for Minneapolis’s urban 
problems in the 1960s and 1970s. As a police officer only recently removed from 
the beat, Stenvig affirmed and embodied the unmediated, practical knowledge 
of the street and everyday experience. In his rhetoric, Stenvig attacked liberals’ 
wonkish attempts to apply theoretical knowledge to “real world” problems and 
dismissed the notion that politicians needed to rely on the expertise of academic 
professors, business leaders, and community activists to govern. This article 
demonstrates that the cultural resentments attributed to the backlash of the 1960s 
and 1970s were not solely motivated by racism and disgust with student protest, 
but also included anger toward liberal expertise. Within a national context, the 
success of Stenvig and other law and order mayors in urban America in the late 
1960s and throughout the 1970s adds an important dimension to developing 
literature on post-World War II conservatism. Adding these municipal histories 
to the narrative of the postwar New Right suggests the depth of grassroots 
disenchantment with liberalism, especially on crime, and highlights the multiple 
yet often compatible ideologies at work within conservatism during the late 
twentieth century.5
Stenvig’s Critique of Liberalism
 As a candidate and mayor, Stenvig offered a powerful and popular critique 
of the liberal ideology that drove Minneapolis’s leaders throughout much of the 
mid-twentieth century. Bringing together politicians in city hall, social scientists at 
the University of Minnesota, and business leaders from the community, the city’s 
liberal leadership established a progressive legacy that imagined government as 
the technocratic management of the people, organizations, and resources that 
comprised society.6 Stenvig rejected this theory of governance, consistently 
emphasizing liberals’ seeming disdain for the knowledge and concerns of 
“average” citizens. 
 In Minneapolis, no one—except perhaps his mentor, Humphrey—
exemplified the liberal ideology of governance better than Arthur Naftalin, 
Stenvig’s immediate predecessor as mayor. A former political scientist who 
moved easily between city hall and academia, Naftalin believed government’s 
role was to use social science and technology to shape the city and its population. 
Naftalin’s involvement in Minneapolis politics began in the early 1940s, when 
he coordinated Humphrey’s 1943 mayoral campaign while he was writing a 
dissertation on third-party politics, and was elected as a DFL mayor in 1961. 
After leaving the mayor’s office in 1969, Naftalin took a position with the School 
of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota.7 Historian Jennifer Delton 
describes Naftalin’s governing philosophy as an example of “political science 
in action,” which forged a close connection between the social sciences of the 
university and the leadership of city hall to govern through the lens of abstract, 
social scientific knowledge.8
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 Naftalin’s connection with academia was a sharp contrast to Stenvig’s open 
animosity toward higher education. Stenvig noted in a 1999 interview that he 
“hated school.” Explaining why he nonetheless received a bachelor’s degree 
from Augsburg College in Minneapolis, Stenvig explained, “my mother said 
one of us kids had to go to college, and I was it. So I got done in three years, got 
[out] of there fast.”9 Much of Stenvig’s support in the 1969 election came from 
voters without a college degree. According to one analysis, voters who attended 
college were far less likely to vote for Stenvig.10 As a supporter of Stenvig’s 
sarcastically pointed out in a letter to the Minneapolis Star after his first victory, 
“Charles Stenvig did everything wrong. . . . He didn’t have a lengthy background 
of education. . . . He was just a cop.”11 Stenvig reiterated his anti-intellectual 
credentials during the 1971 campaign, telling voters, “I’m no brain, I don’t know 
everything, but I’ll dig and I’ll do my best for the city.”12 
 For Stenvig, hard work and a willingness to listen to the concerns of 
Minneapolis residents trumped what he considered to be the abstract knowledge 
of social problems that emanated from the university. The academic community 
reciprocated in its dislike of Stenvig. In a letter to the president of the University 
of Minnesota, one student described “Mayer Stenvile” as someone “whom no 
intellectual could possibly respect,” while a 1969 editorial in the Minnesota 
Daily, the university’s daily newspaper, described Stenvig’s victory as a triumph 
of “a shallow brand of law-and-order” over the “intelligent leadership of Arthur 
Naftalin.”13 Stenvig’s disdain for formal education and emphasis on real-world 
experience helped to break the close connection between the university and the 
mayor’s office that was formed under the city’s previous liberal mayors such as 
Humphrey and Naftalin. 
 In addition to maintaining a close connection between the mayor’s office 
and the University of Minnesota, Naftalin’s background in the social sciences 
led him to believe that government could ultimately function as a science, which, 
theoretically, could be perfected. This belief in the possibilities for rational and 
scientific governance of the city was evident in his long-range thinking about the 
possibilities of city government. Naftalin willingly outlined his programs to the 
press and openly theorized about how government could be improved through 
scientific reforms. Speculating in 1969 about the possibility of consolidating 
the fragmented governments in American metropolitan areas into singular, 
metropolitan-wide entities, Naftalin argued that with “proper computers,” a 
single executive authority could easily—and rationally—control a widely-
scattered metropolitan area. For Naftalin, a rational executive would have to make 
unpopular decisions based on his or her expert knowledge of what was best for 
the city. For example, Naftalin described himself as “an unflagging supporter of 
redevelopment, renewal, rehabilitation, and public housing,” despite pressure 
from neighborhood groups that were “against redevelopment.”14 Stenvig would 
exploit this seeming indifference to the concerns of average citizens by arguing 
that liberal leaders relied on abstract theories to make decisions that profoundly 
affected the lives of city residents.
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 Naftalin and other liberal mayors of the period relied on close collaboration 
with foundations, private businesses, and other existing sites of power—a group 
that Stenvig lumped together as the liberal establishment—to turn their ideas 
into action. Minneapolis’s liberal establishment operated by bringing together 
individuals and institutions and creating a concentration of expertise, authority, 
and financial resources that gave a select group the ability to act across a broad 
network of people, things, and ideas. Minneapolis was not unique in its informal 
alliances between municipal officeholders and business leaders. In his study 
of “regime politics,” Clarence Stone demonstrates how other cities such as 
Atlanta were run by “governing coalitions” that often brought together elected 
officials and business leaders to enact policies that could not be accomplished 
within the often limited scope of municipal power.15 In 1960s Minneapolis, the 
liberal establishment was composed of men (and the establishment was almost 
exclusively male) such as John Cowles, Jr., publisher of the city’s two major 
newspapers, and Donald Dayton, head of Dayton Corporation. In addition to 
their business holdings, both were members of influential organizations like the 
Minneapolis Urban Coalition and the National Alliance of Businessmen. The 
city’s liberal establishment used its unique authority and powerful business and 
social networks to make broad changes in the physical and social fabric of the 
city. 
 One of Stenvig’s main arguments against liberalism was that these few 
influential members of the establishment exerted undue influence and power in 
Minneapolis at the expense of so-called regular citizens. In his 1969 campaign, 
Stenvig harshly critiqued the well-known associations between elected leaders 
and the city’s business and academic elite, arguing that “the little people” were 
“simply tired of the Establishment.”16 Once elected, Stenvig specifically targeted 
Cowles and Dayton, claiming that both men had opposed his 1969 election and 
that their determination to bring about social equality at any cost had left them 
beholden to the demands of minority communities.17 At a basic level, Stenvig’s 
animosity toward liberalism was based on the concentration of power in the hands 
of a few elite leaders, who actively solicited the opinions of black community 
leaders and student protestors, even when they advocated militancy, in order 
to brandish their progressive images. Such an approach, in Stenvig’s opinion, 
amounted to coddling criminals. 
 Stenvig was perhaps nowhere more critical of the liberal establishment 
than in his criticism of the local press, which he accused of portraying him 
negatively because he did not fit their idea of an appropriate mayor with the 
proper qualifications. Throughout his tenure as mayor, Stenvig displayed open 
animosity toward Cowles and his newspapers. Upset by what he perceived as a 
“liberal bias” in the Minneapolis press, Stenvig eventually barred reporters from 
the mayor’s office. At a convention of the League of Women Voters of Minnesota, 
Stenvig told a supporter, “you know what Star spells backwards.” For its part, 
the Minneapolis Star argued that Stenvig’s disdain for the press demonstrated 
his failure to engage in public forums, campaign debates, and other venues 
200  Jeffrey T. Manuel and Andrew Urban
where “the electorate [would have] a chance to make a fair evaluation.”18 In a 
move that foreshadowed the later emergence of conservative alternative media 
venues, Stenvig turned to small right-wing newspapers to promote his message.19 
Although Stenvig was hardly the first—or last—politician to accuse the press of 
negative or biased coverage, his critique of the local media fit within his broader 
dislike of liberalism’s concentration of authority and expertise in the hands of a 
few key figures.
 In addition to his ideological criticism of the local press’s authority, Stenvig 
understood that condemning the press could be politically advantageous. 
Privately, Stenvig admitted that by emphasizing the local media’s disdain for 
him, he was able to assume the role of David combating the establishment’s 
Goliath. As he put it, “what they did was make me look like the little guy against 
a big giant killer.” Stenvig’s 1969 campaign manager, Milton Bix, argued, “the 
majority of the people in Minneapolis do not follow the editorial policy of the 
Star and Tribune . . . the people view the paper as a tool of the power interest 
in Minneapolis. The people wanted someone to represent them. A number of 
people told us they would have not voted for Stenvig had the paper not endorsed 
[Stenvig’s 1969 opponent] Dan Cohen.” Stenvig’s anti-establishment posturing 
extended to other aspects of his mayoral campaign as well. Although he could 
afford it, Stenvig decided not to purchase billboards for his campaign. As 
campaign aide Gordon Johnson (who later became Minneapolis’s police chief) 
noted, Cohen’s “billboards were picturing him in new suits and behind the big 
desk and placed him with the ‘Golden West,’” of the city’s wealthy southwestern 
neighborhoods and western suburbs. As another aide put it in contrast, “the people 
saw these expensive billboards and then they compared them with little Stenvig 
signs . . . we were the poor people’s candidate.”20 
 The animosity between Stenvig and Minneapolis liberals was put in sharp 
relief during a violent student protest at the University of Minnesota in 1972. 
In May of that year, violence exploded on the University of Minnesota campus 
between Minneapolis police and students protesting the Vietnam War. The tear-gas 
shrouded melee on the campus mall was mirrored by a bureaucratic showdown 
between University of Minnesota administrators and Stenvig. Charged with 
overseeing a large urban public university, University of Minnesota leaders 
favored dialogue and reconciliation with student protesters, while Stenvig, elected 
three years earlier on his tough, law and order pledges, believed the protesters 
were acting as criminals and urged direct police action. Stenvig’s handling of 
the 1972 student protests was a telling example of how conservative politicians 
challenged the social scientific and technocratic expertise of liberal leaders such 
as university officials. 
 In May 1972, student protesters occupied and barricaded the main route 
through the University of Minnesota campus in response to President Richard 
Nixon’s decision to mine Haiphong harbor in North Vietnam. University officials 
requested police assistance and Minneapolis police “tactical squads” were soon on 
campus. As the confrontation between police and students escalated into a pitched 
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battle, university officials attempted to contact Stenvig and ask him to order the 
police to use restraint. Although the exact sequence of events during the protest 
is disputed, Stenvig apparently cut off all communication with the university 
during the peak of the crisis, and called the National Guard for reinforcement. 
The protests subsided when the police tear-gassed the protesters occupying 
Washington Avenue and the crowds gathering in the adjacent neighborhood of 
Dinkytown.21 
 In the aftermath of the student protests, university leaders created a 
commission to study the riot and to develop remedies that could prevent further 
violence. The resulting report, which was not completed until more than a year 
after the riots, ultimately accused the police of fermenting the violence during the 
protest: “we must respond that numbers of men and officers of the Minneapolis 
police performed in an abominable fashion.”22 The report also took a decidedly 
academic format that would not have been out of place in a sociology thesis on 
student dissent, including recommendations on academic literature that could 
further illuminate the causes of youthful discontent. After losing control of the 
university to both student protesters and police tactical squads during the May 
1972 events, the commission and its largely theoretical recommendations were 
partly an attempt by university officials to reassert control over the school. 
 Tellingly, Stenvig refused to participate in the commission’s investigation 
altogether. The commission report described the “continuing frustration” of 
the “inability to secure testimony from the Minneapolis Police Department, or 
from Mayor Stenvig.”23 Perhaps Stenvig felt he did not have to answer to the 
university given the broad public support for his handling of the protest. In a 
poll conducted by the Minneapolis Tribune, 78 percent of Twin Cities residents 
expressed approval for the police response to the protests at the university.24 In 
a broader sense, Stenvig likely did not participate in the study because he never 
believed the riots should be an object for intellectual study and contemplation. In 
contrast to the bureaucratic and academic expertise illustrated in the commission 
report, Stenvig believed the cause of the riot—and thus the obvious response to 
it—was the decision by protesters to break the law and flaunt authority. During 
an earlier conflict between Minneapolis police and student protesters, Stenvig 
had expressed his opinion that student dissent was acceptable so long as it 
remained within the boundaries of the law. “It’s alright to be militant,” Stenvig 
argued, “just as long as you do it within the system.”25 The stark difference in 
attitudes between University of Minnesota officials and Stenvig regarding student 
protest—with university leaders seeing the students’ behavior as a radicalized 
generation responding to an unpopular war and Stenvig believing they were 
individuals choosing to break the law—reveals the divide between the governing 
ideology of liberalism and Stenvig’s cognitive framework.
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Stenvig’s Governing Ideology
 If Stenvig was clearly against the underlying ideology of liberalism and its 
deep-seated belief in complex explanations for social problems and strife, what 
philosophy of government did he offer as an alternative? Although Stenvig was 
hardly a political philosopher and his anti-intellectualism limited theorizing on his 
part, a careful reading of his public pronouncements and recommended actions 
suggest that in addition to his sharp criticism of liberalism, Stenvig developed 
a coherent governing ideology. Put simply, Stenvig imagined the city not as a 
complex society of various interest groups needing to be effectively managed—
this was the vision of liberalism—but as a collection of individuals making moral 
choices about right and wrong according to conservatively interpreted Christian 
values, a political worldview that correlates with what sociologist Gerard Delanty 
has described as “conservative communitarianism.”26 The mayor’s role, as 
Stenvig saw it, was not to craft programs or alter the city’s society, but to offer 
an example of moral leadership through his own actions and, when necessary, use 
government to create a framework in which individuals could make the “right” 
choice. Conversely, as his singular dedication to law and order reveals, Stenvig 
did not hesitate to govern through the police when Minneapolis residents acted 
illegally. 
 Responding to the many challenges facing the city in the late 1960s and 
throughout the 1970s, Stenvig consistently offered the simple solution of 
encouraging people to make the right choices and sharply punishing those who 
chose the wrong path. On his first day in city hall, Stenvig told supporters, “In 
the past, we have had a lot of theory, flowery speeches, and news releases on how 
to solve the many problems confronting our city.” In contrast to these previous 
approaches, Stenvig urged “action” and argued, “My philosophy is simple. . . . 
I will not tolerate biased treatment toward any individual or group.”27 From the 
beginning of his mayoral career, Stenvig rejected the idea that social groups within 
the city should be treated differently because of their divergent socioeconomic 
opportunities or past histories. Stenvig’s governing philosophy was, ironically, 
accurately summarized by one of his critics, who noted in an editorial the simple 
and moralistic worldview animating Stenvig’s politics. Facing “crime in the 
streets [and the] breakdown of the law and order,” Stenvig responded with “the 
golden rule.” The critic continued: “A weakening of the traditional moral fiber? 
Ban sex education. A sub-culture that challenges our basic value structure? 
Crack down on all those welfare freeloaders. Mandatory jail sentences for dope 
peddlers.”28 Although the editorial criticized Stenvig’s simple responses to what 
the author felt were complex societal problems, it nonetheless points out how 
Stenvig saw government as a moral authority that held the power to punish 
immoral or illegal choices. 
 In place of proactive governmental programs, Stenvig reasserted the 
importance of individuals making the right choices. After Cohen criticized 
Stenvig’s proposal for tough law enforcement during the 1969 election and 
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suggested that human-relations programs were just as important as police on 
the street, Stenvig replied that his proposed human-relations program could “be 
summed up in one saying: the Golden Rule. If everyone followed this, we would 
take big steps forward.” Indeed, Stenvig likely believed government ultimately 
could do little to affect the moral choices of individuals, besides punishing those 
who broke the law. As he noted in the same context, “You can’t legislate the 
heart.”29 Stenvig’s emphasis on independent decision-making carried over into 
the political realm, where his much-touted independence from political parties 
served to highlight his political worldview. In a newspaper interview, Stenvig 
expressed his opinion that Minnesota’s primary system, which forced voters to 
participate in either the DFL or Republican primaries, was contrary to democracy. 
“You can’t vote for who you want,” Stenvig argued, “I like to vote for the man.”30 
According to Stenvig, voters should decide based on the character and choices 
of an individual, not their participation in a larger group such as a political party. 
 Stenvig’s governing ideology was supplemented by his deeply held religious 
beliefs. In his public rhetoric, Stenvig talked openly about his Christian faith 
and suggested that it offered a model for running the city. In the aftermath of his 
surprising mayoral victory in 1969, Stenvig made his first appointment on the 
spot at a victory celebration, declaring, “My chief advisor is going to be God. 
. . . And don’t you forget it.”31 God was apparently re-appointed by Stenvig in 
1971. After he was informed of his reelection that year, Stenvig told supporters, 
“I guess it was God’s will again. . . . He’ll be in my corner again, I hope. Like 
I say, thank you, God.”32 Stenvig’s claim that God would play an active role in 
city government was mocked by some commentators, but it reflected Stenvig’s 
underlying belief that government’s appropriate role was to enforce the boundary 
between righteous and profane behavior, and, in the process, reward those who 
made appropriate moral choices while punishing those who made poor decisions. 
 Voters elected Stenvig for his get-tough approach to crime in the city and 
his attitude toward crime and policing clearly demonstrates his underlying 
ideology of governance. In the realm of crime, Stenvig argued that his personal 
expertise was superior to the abstract and social scientific knowledge of the 
liberal establishment. Stenvig presented himself to voters as a politician with 
the firsthand experience necessary to deal with crime, precisely the type of 
on-the-ground knowledge that liberals supposedly lacked. Stenvig claimed to 
“know” the crime problem—and thus have the ability to solve it—not through 
the abstractions of sociology or criminology, but through his personal knowledge 
of criminals gained from years of working a beat. After attending a criminology 
conference in Great Britain, Stenvig criticized the academic approach to crime 
evident in the conference speeches: “Some of the conference people seemed to 
know all about the problem, in theory. The police have to deal with crime as a 
fact, not an abstract function.”33 For Stenvig, crime was not an issue of social 
causes or theories, but a matter of individuals choosing to break the law. Thus, 
government’s appropriate function was to catch these criminals and punish them. 
From Stenvig’s perspective, the more liberal politicians sought out explanations 
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to criminal behavior, the more likely criminals were to seize on the excuses that 
liberal experts provided them.
 Stenvig used the connection between police officers and on-the-ground 
knowledge of the crime problem to his political advantage. Stenvig’s experience 
as a police officer “automatically made him a law and order candidate as the 
image was there for us,” according to his campaign manager.34 Rather than 
trying to frame Stenvig as an experienced politician, which his campaign could 
have accomplished by emphasizing his leadership of the police federation, they 
highlighted instead that he was an ordinary officer. The association between 
Stenvig and the police force was so strong that during the 1971 election, his black 
opponent Harry Davis was asked by an elderly white woman, “How are you going 
to protect us if you’re not in charge of the police?”35 Acting as mayor, Stenvig 
translated his personal knowledge of criminals—and his presumed knowledge 
of how to rein them in—into a promise to let the police do their work free from 
oversight boards or political compromises. Stenvig vocally promised to not allow 
“any civilian review board of police as long as I’m mayor,” directly confronting 
the city council’s efforts to establish a commission that would oversee alleged 
discrimination cases and incidents of police brutality.36 Again, Stenvig used his 
on-the-ground expertise as a former police officer to support his ideology of 
crime as a matter of individual choice that should be punished by harsh police 
action. 
 When Stenvig did advocate active government involvement in shaping city 
life, it was often in the name of creating a framework to steer individuals away 
from decisions and activities that he believed threatened the moral vitality of the 
community. Thus, at several points during his career Stenvig tried to censor what 
he believed were immoral publications. During his first administration, Stenvig 
put public pressure on the Minneapolis public library to remove the publications 
Rolling Stone, Black Panther, and New Left Notes, since they advocated drug 
use, disrespect for authority figures, and violence against the police.37 As the 
alleged threat of black and student militancy declined and the corresponding 
need for a crackdown on radical protest lost urgency in the mid-1970s, Stenvig 
focused more on what he called decency issues. In 1975, when Stenvig sought to 
revenge his loss to Albert Hofstede, he sent a letter to ten thousand Minneapolis 
churchgoers accusing then-Mayor Hofstede of “being soft on pornography.” As 
Stenvig explicitly stated, “This is a special appeal to Christian people to help me 
rid the city of the filth we’ve got—increased dirty movies and increased dirty 
bookstores. The present mayor hasn’t said ‘Boo’ about it.”38 While he was back 
in the mayor’s office in 1977, a judge filed a contempt of court order against 
Stenvig after he personally ordered the arrest of an adult bookstore clerk, which 
violated an injunction that prohibited arrests on obscenity charges.39 Banning these 
materials was an appropriate use of government, in Stenvig’s eyes, because it 
prevented the temptation that could lead to immoral or illegal choices by citizens. 
 Stenvig was also hostile to the gay rights movement that emerged in 
Minneapolis during his time as mayor. During his final administration, Stenvig 
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was a vocal critic of the city’s Gay Pride Day amendment, which legislated a 
day recognizing and celebrating Minneapolis’s gay community. He repeatedly 
held up the amendment (passed during the two years when he was out of 
office) as an example of Hofstede’s leniency regarding “moral values” and 
tried to force the council into revoking it. In 1977, his wife Audrey Stenvig ran 
for a seat on the Minneapolis school board at the same time that Charles was 
running for the mayor’s office. In her campaign, Audrey promised to prevent 
“admitted homosexuals” from working as teachers in the public school system 
and Charles supported the proposal, saying, “I am running for the school board 
through my wife.”40 In a broader sense, Stenvig seemed to reject the very idea 
that homosexuals represented a distinct social interest group within the city. 
Describing his response to the demands of Minneapolis’s gay and lesbian 
community in the 1970s, Stenvig claimed, “I knew several of the gay leaders 
. . . and I told them if they wanted to be treated like everyone else, just obey 
the law like everyone else.”41 This claim, however, was not consistent with his 
actions. Stenvig did not tolerate gays and lesbians in Minneapolis as long as they 
obeyed the law (as he implied was the case), but instead treated homosexuality 
as an inherent threat that demanded active suppression. Since Stenvig seemed 
to believe homosexuality was a violation of shared community values, the gay 
rights movement had no valid place in Stenvig’s governing philosophy. In the 
same manner that Stenvig resisted social scientific explanations surrounding the 
origins and reasons for criminal activity, he also refused to think of sexuality 
as a complex and varied facet of social behavior that could accommodate non-
heterosexual relationships.
 Given Stenvig’s ideology of governance, it is not surprising that he proposed 
few active programs as mayor. Observers at the time, familiar with the social 
engineering of liberal mayors, were surprised that Stenvig had so few programs to 
offer. Stenvig’s initial two-year term in office was marked by what commentators 
believed was a decided lack of any governmental activity. “Almost no programs 
emanate from Stenvig’s walnut-paneled suite,” one reporter noted. Stenvig vetoed 
almost every bill presented by the city council. A liberal Republican city council 
member even questioned the underlying logic of Stenvig’s mayoralty: “I don’t 
think Stenvig is even trying to provide leadership in the traditional sense,” the 
councilmember claimed, arguing that he saw “Stenvig acting as a spokesman 
for what’s called the Silent Majority, and that thrust has been largely negative.”42 
When compared to the liberal mayors who preceded him, Stenvig’s time in office 
produced little active government programming. Yet this inaction was consistent 
with Stenvig’s belief in government’s proper role as guardian of community 
values rather than social engineer. Although opponents in the 1971 election 
criticized Stenvig for simply vetoing city council proposals and not offering any 
programs of his own, Stenvig responded that these vetoes were “affirmative” 
because “the people have had it up to here with government and it was time to 
put a stop to it.”43 
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 Stenvig’s supporters actually saw the lack of government programs as a 
positive development, and emphasized instead the value they placed in Stenvig’s 
character and his image as mayor. Reviewing Stenvig’s first two-year term as 
mayor, a reporter argued, “one impression of Minneapolis under Stenvig seems 
unarguable . . . [;] it is that a policeman-mayor can give a city confronted with 
change a feeling of security, even while temporizing on important issues.” The 
reporter quoted a cabdriver: “Stenvig hasn’t done much. He hasn’t done much 
right and he hasn’t done much wrong. But it’s nice to know that if anything 
happens we’ve got a tough guy who can handle it in City Hall.”44 In turning his 
political ideology into practical action, Stenvig rejected the activist government 
involvement of liberalism and instead sought to lead by moral example and 
character. Although critics accused Stenvig of offering more style than substance, 
the two were indistinguishable in the minds of many of his supporters. His style 
of making few public speeches, promising to take direct action against criminals, 
and his personal history with the police all contributed to the personal image he 
cultivated of the strong, resolute executive and the masculine antidote to what he 
portrayed as the emasculated style of liberal governance. As a female supporter 
commented, “[Stenvig] can bring about many changes that have resulted from 
too many years of parental permissiveness which has resulted with so many of 
our young people defying authority in so many ways.”45 In a letter to the editor, 
another Minneapolis resident admitted that Minneapolis had problems under 
Stenvig but declared that he would continue to support him because no other 
candidate “has the intestinal fortitude that Chuck Stenvig has got.”46 For Stenvig, 
one of the mayor’s primary responsibilities was to act tough and appear virtuous. 
 Stenvig’s emphasis on his independent status allowed him to claim that he 
was vulnerable to attacks from Minneapolis’s established political parties. In 
the 1973 election, which Hofstede won by a margin of less than 5,000 votes, 
Stenvig blamed his defeat on the party forces aligned against him. Prior to the 
election, the Minnesota state legislature passed a law requiring candidates to 
designate party membership with either the DFL or the Republican Parties, in 
order to appear on primary ballots. Labeled the “Stenvig law” by the incumbent 
mayor and his supporters, Stenvig argued that the legislation’s sole function was 
to make it more difficult for him to get reelected. In addition, Stenvig pointed out 
that his opponent, Hofstede, vastly outspent him during the campaign due largely 
to the strong DFL backing for Hofstede. Sarcastically, Stenvig accused the Star 
and Tribune newspapers of slanted electoral coverage and of doing a “beautiful 
job” of preventing his reelection. Stenvig had gone into the 1973 election with 
a significant lead in the polls and he was clearly surprised by his defeat, even 
insinuating that the DFL had illegally registered voters in precincts where they 
were not residents, effectively tipping the scales against him.47
 The media pointed to other reasons for Hofstede’s victory. Stenvig’s hostility 
to college-educated police and the value of higher learning in general came back 
to hurt him in 1973. In 1969 and 1971, Minneapolis’s police federation endorsed 
Stenvig and unofficially assisted his campaign. In 1973, however, the federation 
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voted to remain neutral, in part because college-educated police did not support 
Stenvig’s approach to solving crime. As former chief of police Donald Dwyer 
commented, Stenvig represented “the old, historical hard-nosed cop versus quite a 
lot of idealism in a younger, far better educated group who are disenchanted with 
the present administration.”48 Without the federation’s endorsement, Stenvig’s 
ability to promote himself as the policeman’s candidate for bringing law and 
order to the city was greatly weakened. In addition, Hofstede, a DFL insider, 
tapped into the party’s connections with organized labor in a manner that neither 
of Stenvig’s previous opponents had been able to do. In 1973 the major labor 
unions in Minneapolis endorsed Hofstede, reversing their 1971 position. While 
Stenvig continued to receive rank-and-file support, it declined enough to help 
the DFL claim victory.49
 After defeating Hofstede in a 1975 rematch which Stenvig won by 
approximately 500 votes, Stenvig’s final defeat occurred in 1977 and was also 
related to perceptions of his personal character. For most of his last term, there 
was widespread speculation that he would simply walk away from the job of 
mayor. Rather than challenging these rumors, Stenvig fueled them further. Only 
four months after the 1975 election the Minneapolis Tribune reported Stenvig as 
saying, “if the right offer comes along, I’ll get out.”50 Such a lackluster response 
to his job—after an election he had barely won—must have disappointed 
supporters who still believed Stenvig was a resolute fighter willing to take on 
any challenges. At the same time, Stenvig found himself embroiled in personal 
scandal. Prior to the 1977 election, he was accused by a DFL alderman (and 
former police officer) of padding his police overtime pay when he was on the 
force between his loss in 1973 and re-election in 1975. Although the police 
department’s internal affairs unit ultimately cleared Stenvig of the charges, it 
refused to release any of the files from the investigation. This personal scandal 
was a harsh blow to Stenvig’s credibility as a model of virtue for the city.51 His 
emphasis on the mayor’s responsibility to act as a moral leader for the city allowed 
Stenvig to avoid debates about policy, but it also set the stage for his downfall 
amid allegations of scandal. 
From Ideology to Practice: Reorganizing the
City’s Social “Interest Groups”
 As this article has argued up to this point, Stenvig challenged liberalism’s 
governing ideology that the mayor should act as a technocratic manager of the 
city’s social interest groups, instead offering his own philosophy of government 
that emphasized individuals’ responsibility to act morally and uphold “traditional” 
values, such as a respect for authority figures. Yet as mayor, Stenvig could not 
wipe the slate clean after several decades of liberal leadership in Minneapolis. 
Unable to ignore them altogether, Stenvig worked with the social interest groups 
that liberal politicians devoted specific attention to—such as organized labor 
and African Americans—and attempted to realign them into something more 
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amenable to his own ideologies of government. In other words, even though 
Stenvig believed the city was composed of individuals responsible for controlling 
their own actions, many of these individuals saw themselves as part of distinct 
social groups, such as labor, African Americans, and business, that had a collective 
identity and demanded acknowledgement from government. Stenvig could not 
erase these identities, but he could—and did—suggest other identities more in 
line with his vision of the city. 
 The working-class vote was a crucial base of support for DFL politicians in 
Minneapolis prior to Stenvig’s 1969 election. Stenvig, too, relied on white, blue-
collar voters for his mayoral victories, but he also sought to subtly change the 
meaning of a working-class or blue-collar identity away from a purely economic 
station. Stenvig frequently talked in terms that might be classified as discussions 
of “class,” but his rhetoric catered to a working class that was organized around a 
vague set of cultural resentments rather than any concrete economics.52 It is clear 
that by the late 1960s and 1970s the question of who was qualified to represent the 
social abstraction of Minneapolis’s “working class” was up for grabs. Stenvig’s 
victory revealed the distance between liberal politicians, the labor leaders they 
courted, and the city’s working-class voters. 
 Labor leaders backed Dan Cohen, Stenvig’s Republican opponent, in the 
1969 election but Stenvig nevertheless convincingly won majorities of up to 
81 percent in the city’s blue-collar wards.53 In 1971, the AFL-CIO Minneapolis 
Central Labor Union Council, the Teamsters, and the Building and Trades Unions 
officially endorsed Stenvig, although observers believed that labor leaders were 
following the rank-and-file support for Stenvig in an attempt to remain relevant 
to their members.54 Stenvig also pitched himself to white, blue-collar voters 
through his critique of liberals and by promising to end economic programs 
specifically directed at minority communities. Stenvig’s frequent use of the term 
“workingman” alludes to this subtle reshaping of working-class identity around 
cultural resentments in Stenvig’s rhetoric. “People are sick and tired of politicians 
and intellectuals,” Stenvig claimed in a telling pairing, adding, “They want an 
average workingman from the community to represent them—and that’s me.”55 
 Closely connected to his appeal to the “average workingman,” Stenvig also 
tapped into an emerging discourse of victimhood among Minneapolis’s white, 
working-class population that rejected what they perceived as the differential 
treatment minority groups received, and the lax attitude politicians displayed 
toward student radicals. As a Minneapolis resident wrote to the Tribune before 
the 1969 election, “It seems that [Naftalin’s] present administration has created a 
legion of untouchables and no warrant can be served, regardless of the seriousness 
of the crime, because of interference from high authority.”56 A machinist reiterated 
this point in the immediate aftermath of Stenvig’s 1969 victory: “They should 
start jailing some of them guys who are breaking the law, regardless of race, color 
or creed. They shouldn’t let a minority get by with probation or short sentences 
while everybody else gets the book thrown at them.”57 Although scholars have 
interpreted white claims to victimhood in the 1960s and 1970s as a reaction 
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to the excesses of liberalism, they also illustrate a growing dissatisfaction 
with liberals’ claim that their social scientific expertise made them the natural 
managers of the city’s problems.58 Stenvig took advantage of this sentiment in 
the late 1960s, displaying (or, perhaps more accurately, performing) a type of 
vigilante resistance. If blacks in Minneapolis faced discrimination and violence, 
so did whites like Stenvig. Referencing alleged threats on his life during the 1969 
campaign, Stenvig proudly asserted that he “‘got a carbine and sat in the window’ 
of his home one night when he was informed that ‘they’ intended to dynamite his 
house and endanger his family.”59 Stenvig’s appeal to white victimhood suggests 
that Minneapolis residents had embraced alternative identities that were in direct 
opposition to liberal policies that presented African Americans as the true victims 
of social problems.60 
 Perhaps nowhere was Stenvig’s attempt to redefine how different groups 
perceived of their interests more complex than in the arena of race. In his rhetoric 
and policies regarding African Americans, Stenvig attempted to craft a political 
language that could admit the existence of racial difference while denying the 
effects of racism’s legacy. Although Stenvig denied that his political strategy 
included appealing to white racism, his law and order rhetoric likely appealed, 
even if indirectly, to the racist vote.61 This issue has vexed historians as well, who 
have questioned whether public support for law and order in the 1960s and 1970s 
represented a type of thinly veiled racism that was also present in the attempts 
of urban whites to block residential integration. A rich body of scholarship has 
shown that while urban whites acting to maintain residential segregation could 
be explicitly racist, they also claimed to be defending property values or a shared 
ethnic culture.62 Stenvig’s political use of law and order was similarly complex. 
As Kenneth Durr argues in the case of Baltimore’s working-class whites in the 
1960s, discussions of law and order took off just as more overt racist language 
was waning. For Durr, this indicates that “the popular appeals to ‘law and order’ 
that saturated urban American politics by the late 1960s were not merely racism 
in disguise—they were qualitatively different.”63 Although Dan Cohen, Stenvig’s 
opponent in the 1969 election, called him “nothing more than a George Wallace 
in Minneapolis clothes,” such attacks do not capture the nuances of how race 
mattered as a political issue in this period.64 
 At the national level, many observers were surprised that race could even 
be a political issue in Minneapolis given the city’s numerically small minority 
population. Describing Stenvig’s popularity, a reporter from Harper’s expressed 
surprise at his success in a city where “there are practically no Negroes.” He 
added that with a population that was “only 3 percent Negro . . . you wonder 
what the whites are afraid of.”65 The number of African Americans living in 
Minneapolis was growing during this period, but it remained small compared with 
other American cities. During the 1960s, Minneapolis’s non-white population 
grew from 11,785 to 18,998, an increase of 38 percent. Still, African Americans 
counted for only 4.5 percent of the city’s total population in 1970.66
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 Although the city’s African American population was relatively small it 
was concentrated in several neighborhoods, which led to frequent incidents of 
alleged police harassment and the belief that residents of black neighborhoods 
were treated unfairly by the overwhelmingly white police force. Incidents of 
racial unrest occurred in Minneapolis, along with many other American cities, 
in the late 1960s. Routinely during his mayoral campaigns, Stenvig would raise 
the specter of Minneapolis’s 1967 riots as an example of the real threat of black 
militancy. The disturbances resulted in destroyed buildings and businesses along 
Plymouth Avenue in Minneapolis’s predominantly black North Side. While police 
response to the disturbance was restrained, Mayor Naftalin ultimately asked for 
assistance from the National Guard after two nights of rioting. Minneapolis’s 
riots were small in comparison to the Detroit riots that began several days later, 
but they nonetheless provoked an angry response from some of the city’s white 
population. For example, four white youths were arrested during the riots after 
they attempted to bypass a National Guard barricade. The youths said they were 
trying to prevent “you niggers coming up to the northeast.” For some Minneapolis 
residents, the appropriate response to the riots was not restraint but aggressive 
confrontation.67
 Stenvig used the riots not only to attack Naftalin’s and liberals’ distrust 
of the police force, but also to challenge the wisdom of programs he felt were 
designed to appease black activists and radicals. As he commented to a gathering 
of supporters following his 1969 election, “if we have riots, what’s the good 
of all these programs if it takes you years to build society up and they burn it 
down.”68 Six years after the actual disturbances Stenvig was still alluding to their 
implications, pledging that he would continue his efforts to “stop them from 
trying to burn people out of their homes and businesses.”69 As the Minneapolis 
Figure 2: National Guard soldiers on a North Minneapolis street after distur-
bances in 1967. Image courtesy of Minnesota Historical Society.
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Star editorialized, “never in our memory has a Stenvig law-and-order euphemism 
been so inescapably pointed in its reference to minorities.”70 Despite the city’s 
small minority population, the 1967 riots had a profound effect on white attitudes 
toward African Americans and crime, on which Stenvig willingly capitalized. 
 Stenvig’s opponents frequently accused him of racism and argued that his 
calls for law and order were barely coded forms of racism. During the 1971 
mayoral campaign, African-American DFL candidate Harry Davis repeatedly 
tried to label Stenvig a racist and force him to admit that his practice of rhetorically 
linking African Americans with crime was a thin disguise for racism. Davis drew 
attention to Stenvig’s enervating of the city’s civil rights department, making 
it powerless over cases of police brutality. Davis claimed these actions were 
“allowing brutes and sadists to run wild in this city.” Stenvig refuted these claims 
by arguing that brutality worked both ways. He cited the personal example of 
being attacked by a criminal during a routine arrest.71 Just as Stenvig offered voters 
an image of him in the dark with a gun, ready to protect his home from criminals 
that Minneapolis liberals let run free, Stenvig framed himself as a victim, 
making a valiant stand on behalf of all police officers and, at times, white voters. 
 There was intense controversy over the treatment of African Americans in 
Minneapolis during Stenvig’s first two years as mayor. Stenvig’s critics accused 
him of “emasculating” administrative bodies intended to oversee the city’s 
police. When a 12-year-old African-American boy was attacked by a police dog 
and dragged down the street by two policemen, many saw it as confirmation of 
Stenvig’s attitude toward blacks. Supporters of Stenvig and officials in the police 
department denied these allegations. Deputy police chief Eugene Wilson called 
them “baloney,” noting that a 1971 grand jury investigated thirty cases of alleged 
police brutality in the city and found “no evidence of a deliberate, calculated 
policy of unfair, repressive law enforcement.”72 Although condemned in some 
quarters as a racist, Stenvig consistently denied these charges by insisting that 
he simply treated all criminals equally, a position consistent with his political 
ideology but ignorant of other factors affecting the nexus of race and crime.
 Just as he challenged liberals’ sociological explanations in the political realm 
by offering examples culled from personal experience, Stenvig argued that his 
personal and intimate interactions with blacks proved that he was not racist. In 
1969, Stenvig campaigned with Lon Perry, a black woman, and publicized a 
1963 incident when he gave mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to her child. As Perry 
stated to the media several times: “He wasn’t a racist when he put his lips to my 
baby’s!”73 Another anecdote Stenvig used repeatedly during campaign events 
was his friendship with the starting football guard on the high school football 
team, to whom he had served as a back-up.74
 After his election in 1969, Stenvig appointed Richard Parker, a conservative 
African-American community activist from North Minneapolis, as an aide and 
member of his inner council. Stenvig implied that literal physical closeness 
with African Americans refuted charges of racism and worked against the social 
scientific understandings of race supported by Minneapolis liberals. At a 1970 
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church meeting, Stenvig distanced himself from residential segregationists and 
claimed that he would gladly welcome black neighbors into his working-class 
white neighborhood because, he said, “we’re all brothers under the skin.” He was 
quick to add, however, “We’re not going to be able to legislate it. It will have 
to come from ourselves.”75 Critiquing a plan put forward by the city council to 
ensure city contractors hired minorities, Stenvig argued that instead of making 
“hiring minority people” a prerequisite, the city should simply focus on “getting 
the best dollar value and getting the job done.”76 Once again, Stenvig asserted that 
he was not racist but simply insisted on treating all citizens the same, regardless 
of race. This early formulation of a seemingly neutral language of racial politics 
reveals that if liberalism had a language to discuss race, conservatives were 
developing their own racial lexicon in a manner that could not be dismissed as 
simple bigotry. 
 Stenvig complicates the too-easy answer that 1960s and 1970s populists 
were politically successful solely because of racism. Like conservative politicians 
today, Stenvig fashioned a language that he touted as race neutral—he claimed 
that he was concerned with crime, rioting, and militancy, not the race of the agents 
behind these actions. Yet “race blind” accounts of social problems deny and ignore 
the structural forces that have historically made race salient, such as access to 
jobs, housing, and education.77 Nor do they provide insight into how Stenvig’s 
constituents thought of race and how they possibly linked his strong rhetoric 
about crime with overtly racist beliefs. During the 1971 mayoral campaign against 
Harry Davis, for example, Davis received death threats and had to request FBI 
protection. At times, he was only able to campaign in certain neighborhoods 
when escorted by former Vice President Humphrey or Congressman Don Fraser.78 
Obviously, for certain Minneapolis residents Stenvig’s law-and-order appeals 
were inseparable from explicit antipathy toward the city’s black population. 
 Nevertheless, many liberals were also responsible for assuming that law 
and order was solely a racial issue when they advanced a political discourse that 
made it hard to separate race and crime. Christopher Wren, a former District of 
Columbia police officer, wrote in the Washington Monthly that the success of 
politicians like Philadelphia’s Frank Rizzo and Stenvig could not be reduced to 
simple racism, arguing “that crime in the streets has a reality for most Americans 
that goes beyond simple code words.” Wren went so far as to link liberal 
explanations for crime with a type of suburban-based elitism, which in his opinion, 
“perpetuates, if only implicitly, the myth that the only suitable environment for 
stable personality development is the white, middle-class suburb.” Although 
Wren had campaigned for George McGovern in 1972, he was frustrated with 
liberal “remoteness—physical and philosophical—from the center of violent 
criminal activity.”79 While Stenvig made no concerted effort to distance himself 
from racist supporters, he also promoted law and order as an issue that could be 
seen in non-racial terms, a view that directly challenged liberals’ insistence on 
the connection between race and crime. 
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Conclusion
 After his surprising victory in 1969 and landslide reelection in 1971, Stenvig’s 
popularity with Minneapolis voters declined in the mid-1970s. Returned to office 
with a very narrow victory in 1975, Stenvig lost to Hofstede in the 1977 election 
and never again held public office. Lacking the party and business connections 
that have traditionally allowed defeated politicians to remain active in public 
life, Stenvig remained largely outside the public eye since his political defeats 
in the late-1970s. If he is remembered at all by Twin Cities residents today, his 
name functions as shorthand for memories of the conservative backlash of the 
late 1960s and 1970s. As a reporter noted during the 1993 Minneapolis mayoral 
election, “mention of that name—Charlie Stenvig—still sends a shudder through 
the city’s progressive hearts.”80 
 Stenvig retired to Sun City, Arizona. Unlike many other former Minneapolis 
mayors who moved easily between political offices, corporate jobs, and 
academic positions, Stenvig simply returned to the police force after leaving 
the mayor’s office. His “outsider” status and lack of party affiliation limited his 
connections with influential people and organizations. The Cowles and Daytons 
of Minneapolis had little desire to bring Stenvig into the city’s civic life as a 
private citizen. As Stenvig told a reporter in 1999 while proudly declaring that 
he did not profit from political office, “Hey, how many former big mayors do 
you know who live in a house trailer?”81 In personal conversations with the 
authors of this article, Stenvig adamantly attempted to distance his legacy from 
accusations that his brand of politics was racist. Reminiscing, Stenvig was much 
more comfortable emphasizing the novelty of his political career, portraying 
himself as the novice who happened to be in the right place at the right time. 
These memories downplay his acumen as a politician who successfully attracted 
widespread support by attacking both the image and governing rationale of the 
city’s liberal establishment. Stenvig died on February 22, 2010.
 Stenvig’s career was not a novelty act but rather an illustration of the changing 
ideologies and philosophies of governance at work in the late twentieth century. 
In a city known for its liberal leadership and the close connections between city 
hall, academia, and progressive business leaders, Stenvig effectively challenged 
the ideology of liberalism. He criticized the concentrated power of the liberal 
establishment and their claim that social scientific expertise allowed them to 
rely on abstract theories to alter people’s lives in the city. Although arguably 
conservative politicians today rely on their own cadres of social scientists who 
produce ideologically compatible expertise, like Stenvig, many openly mock 
liberals’ reliance on complex sociological explanations for issues such as crime 
and poverty. In addition, as Stenvig realized, contemporary voters still stake 
importance in a candidate’s personal image and perceived morality and these 
credentials at times matter more than a politician’s educational background. 
 While Stenvig’s story is significant in its own right and his charismatic 
personality and media-ready quotes make for a fascinating narrative, when placed 
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in the context of other law and order mayors who gained office in the 1960s and 
1970s the national significance of law and order mayors is evident. Los Angeles’s 
Sam Yorty, for example, cultivated a populist persona as mayor during the 1960s 
and early 1970s. Yorty fended off accusations that government negligence of Los 
Angeles’s African-American community was responsible for the Watts Riots by 
turning the table on his critics and calling for increased law and order and stricter 
punishment for black criminals. In the 1969 Los Angeles mayoral election, Yorty 
successfully portrayed his African-American opponent, Tom Bradley, as soft on 
crime because Bradley proposed a civilian review board to examine allegations 
of police brutality in minority neighborhoods. Yorty also used political allies 
to insinuate that the Students for a Democratic Society and the Black Panther 
Party had put Bradley up for election. These allegations were particularly ironic 
because Bradley had served as a police officer for twenty years before entering 
politics and Yorty had initially supported him as a moderate Democrat. Although 
Yorty began his political career as a New Deal Democrat, he steadily moved to 
the right while in office. In 1960, Yorty endorsed Richard Nixon’s presidential 
campaign and, after losing to Jerry Brown in the 1966 California Democratic 
gubernatorial primary, he offered his support to Brown’s Republican opponent, 
Ronald Reagan. In 1973, Yorty switched parties altogether, although that year 
he was defeated by Bradley, who became Los Angeles’s first black mayor.82 
 In Philadelphia, Frank Rizzo followed Stenvig’s path from the police force to 
city hall. Earning a reputation as a “supercop” who was tough on crime and black 
militancy while police commissioner of Philadelphia, Rizzo won the mayor’s 
office in 1971. As Stefano Luconi highlights, like Stenvig, Rizzo rose to power 
in a city where liberal ideas had dominated municipal politics in the 1960s. For 
example, Italian Americans and the other white ethnic groups that propelled 
Rizzo to office were hesitant to support increased public school financing and 
new curriculum initiatives, which many thought were “too concerned with 
African American grievances.” In the 1971 election, the Democratic Rizzo 
faced a liberal Republican opponent in Thacher Longstreth, the former executive 
director of the Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce who was closely tied 
to the same elite social circles that Stenvig denounced in Minneapolis. Whereas 
Longstreth criticized police brutality, Rizzo pledged open warfare against the 
Black Panthers. As police commissioner, Rizzo was involved in an internationally 
publicized incident in which several Black Panthers were strip searched in front 
of television cameras and, during his time as mayor, he was the defendant in a 
federal civil rights lawsuit that accused the Philadelphia police department of 
institutionally discriminating against black residents. Rizzo and Stenvig also had 
personal connections. Prior to his election, Rizzo visited Stenvig in Minneapolis 
to learn how a policeman could successfully run for mayor of a major American 
city.83 The political success of law and order mayors such as Stenvig, Yorty, and 
Rizzo, among others, highlights the continuing politicization of crime at the local 
level, a development that greatly weakened liberals’ ability to discuss crime as a 
product of social conditions. The end result of this new discourse of crime was, 
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as Flamm puts it, a “political atmosphere in which grim expectations displaced 
grand ambitions.”84 
 Stenvig also offers an intriguing example of the political ideology behind 
conservative populism. Historians now acknowledge that the New Right is a 
multifaceted movement, but conservative populists such as Stenvig have received 
relatively little attention as important contributors to an intellectual history of 
modern conservatism. Attributing the support of law and order conservatives 
such as Stenvig to pure racism or knee-jerk reactionaries does not capture 
the complexity or coherence of his approach to governing. Far from a naïve 
reactionary, Stenvig presented a political ideology that was sharply critical of 
liberalism and rejected social scientific knowledge and abstractions as useful 
guides for governance. Although it is unlikely that Charles Stenvig was familiar 
with conservative academic critiques of liberal social policies, by the late 1960s 
prominent conservative intellectuals had begun offering a counterpoint to liberal 
concern about the “urban crisis.” Edward Banfield’s 1970 The Unheavenly City, 
argued that while American cities faced problems involving crime, race relations, 
and poverty, when liberals made these issues into a broader “urban crisis” they 
exaggerated the problems at hand for the purpose of advancing their own social 
scientific objectives. Writing about urban crime, Banfield posited that “‘subjective’ 
factors (such as alienation) can seldom be defined and related to crime with much 
precision” and that ostensibly “‘objective’ factors (such as housing)” were 
similarly vague, since they failed to account for the “culture and personality” 
of the individual criminal. Although Stenvig did not reference Banfield and as a 
mayoral candidate his depictions of criminal intent did not call on an academic 
language, they nonetheless shared a critique of liberalism’s underlying logic for 
addressing crime. Conversely, Stenvig’s liberal predecessor Arthur Naftalin—
professor of public affairs at the University of Minnesota in 1970—responded 
to Banfield’s argument with sarcasm, commenting that the book “relieves us of 
all responsibility for doing anything about urban problems.”85 Naftalin was not 
alone in his belief that there was a real and definite need for liberal social policies 
and that to suggest otherwise was to set cities like Minneapolis on a dangerous 
path. Ironically, one reporter noted that Minneapolis’s political experts “couldn’t 
believe law and order [was] a viable issue in [Minneapolis] and a state where 
civil and human rights organizations, religious and secular, multiply and feed on 
each other.”86 In other words, these experts could not see how the committees, 
organizations, and alliances they had created to make Minneapolis liberal had 
actually contributed to Stenvig’s rise.
 Finally, confronting the intellectual history of conservative populists such as 
Stenvig is a difficult task precisely because Stenvig was so critical of the inherent 
power dynamic underlying social scientific understandings of urban problems 
and governance. For example, Stenvig’s statement that “my chief advisor is going 
to be God” demonstrates the distance between academic analysis and Stenvig’s 
politics. Stenvig’s liberal contemporaries mocked this comment and we have 
found that it can produce laughter when repeated today. Most scholarly disciplines 
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that deal with politics do not to have a model that includes deities as advisors or 
participants in government. Yet if Stenvig’s reliance on God sounds far-fetched, 
Stenvig argued that liberal governance relied on a set of a priori assumptions that 
were equally far-fetched in comparison: for example, the idea that crime could 
be solved by researching its social origins and investing in remedying them, as 
opposed to simply arresting and imprisoning criminals. 
 The goal of this particular article is not to rehabilitate or justify Charles 
Stenvig’s method of governing. Instead, we are trying to understand and take 
seriously the culture of modern conservatism and its vision for governing. Doing 
this for Stenvig and other conservative populists will likely require wrestling 
with a series of difficult questions that seem to defy any easy answers.
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